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Central Intelligence Agency



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
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

15 June 1989

Cambodian Diplomacy: Beginning the End Game? [REDACTED]

SUMMARY

We believe the meeting last month between Prince Sihanouk and State of Cambodia (SOC), formerly People's Republic of Kampuchea, Prime Minister Hun Sen marked a turning point in efforts to reach a political agreement. The two negotiators narrowed the gap between them, but, more important in our view, they now agree that Hun Sen's administration will anchor an interim government and are working to reshape it to accommodate coalition arrangements. The Khmer Rouge under duress has endorsed this approach. The negotiating framework Sihanouk and Hun Sen have established is delicate and subject to sudden collapse, but it may culminate in early August in an international conference that ostensibly will complete an agreement. Vietnam will probably ensure that the diplomatic process proceeds apace by withdrawing large contingents of troops this summer and possibly by moving up its 30 September deadline for complete evacuation. [REDACTED]



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Threads of a Settlement: The "External" Issues

Since the diplomatic ball began rolling nearly two years ago, Vietnam has tried to distinguish between the "external issues"--the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, the cutoff of external aid to the four Khmer factions, and international control of a settlement--and the "internal" problems of powersharing in a new government. Although the resistance and its Chinese and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) backers have fought to avoid the distinction because it allows Vietnam to distance itself from the conflict and does not protect resistance political equities, the uneven progress in resolving these issues has been divided roughly along the lines imposed by Hanoi. [REDACTED]

Vietnam's Withdrawal. Vietnam in April moved up its timetable to leave Cambodia by the end of September, and we believe Hanoi intends to honor that commitment. [REDACTED]

The withdrawal is Vietnam's primary diplomatic tool and Hanoi has used it to pursue several objectives:

- Progressively shorter timetables have helped stimulate and set the pace of diplomacy. Vietnam repeatedly warns that time for negotiation will expire once it has left Cambodia, for example. The 30 September deadline now seems to be driving negotiations.
- Hanoi has focused international attention on and abjured responsibility for a possible return to power by the Khmer Rouge. The early withdrawal deadline helps further define the Khmer Rouge problem and dilutes the villainous image Hanoi earned by invading.
- Vietnam also started the process of creating an independent identity for its client in Phnom Penh. The combination of Hanoi's troop withdrawals and concern over the Khmer Rouge has cast the SOC to some observers as a viable and preferable alternative. [REDACTED]

External Support for the Khmer Factions. We are uncertain what effect the current turmoil in Beijing will have on China's overall policy toward Cambodia. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

International Monitoring. Adequate verification of Vietnam's troop withdrawal and the termination of outside aid for the Khmer factions is pivotal to an overall political settlement. We believe there is room for compromise on formulating an international control mechanism.

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
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The exact membership, size, and function of an international control mechanism are not yet clearly defined, however.




The Internal Question: Powersharing


Although the external issues are not resolved, the problem of governing Cambodia after a settlement and before a permanent regime is established is the biggest obstacle to a solution.



As a result, Sihanouk and Hun Sen have a general framework for an interim government and are negotiating the terms. Both sides are optimistic about further compromise.



Sihanouk and Hun Sen's new diplomatic momentum substantially raises the ante to the Khmer Rouge, in our view. The guerrillas were deliberately excluded from the Jakarta meeting in May and Sihanouk separated himself from his resistance partners by claiming to speak only for his group. These factors along with the positive tone and measurable results of the meeting further isolate the Khmer Rouge.



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- [REDACTED]
- Among these, according to press reports, is a new draft constitution for Cambodia modeled after France's Fifth Republic that they submitted last month for Sihanouk's consideration.

- [REDACTED]
- Press reports indicate Pol Pot has nominally resigned as head of the High Institute for National Defense, although he will stay on as a "researcher". [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

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Pages: 6

Exemptions: (b)(1), (b)(3)

[REDACTED]

Looking Ahead a Few Months

Along with narrowing their differences, Sihanouk and Hun Sen have tentatively established a three-step process to iron out remaining disagreements over the next several months. They plan to resume bilateral talks in Paris on 24 July, to convene a summit of the four Khmer factions the following day, and to open an international conference there in early August.

[REDACTED]

If the negotiations produce a solution, and we believe they will, any agreement reached most likely will be fragile and threatened by deep-seated animosity, distrust, and other factors including:

- Efforts by the various factions to enhance their position before restrictive provisions take effect.
- Violations of the agreement thereafter.
- Differing interpretations of the provisions of a settlement.
- Disputes among coalition partners trying to coadminister the country.
- The limitations of any controlling mechanism.

The dramatic transition in Phnom Penh will also inhibit efforts to establish order in the countryside.

[REDACTED]

Stability and order will vary greatly in outlying areas as will the relative influence of the Khmer factions.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

What If Diplomacy Fails?

Vietnam's withdrawal without a comprehensive settlement entails greater uncertainty, in our view, because there would be no framework even on paper for establishing order or reconciling the warring factions.

[REDACTED]

Vietnam's withdrawal without a comprehensive settlement, nevertheless, could lead to a partial agreement on at least some of the "external" issues.

[REDACTED]

We would also not rule out further talks and a compromise among the Khmer on powersharing after September although Hun Sen probably could drive a harder bargain then. He probably believes his chances for international recognition will improve substantially after Hanoi leaves. He also says he will hold elections within three months, which would help his cause and enhance his standing if he is challenged politically.

[REDACTED]